Distinguishing Between Reckless and Deliberate Acts of Terrorism

                The understanding of terrorism within the United States is severely flawed. The permissibility of the actions that the United States has taken in its war on terrorism appears to hinge upon which country these drones are located in and whose civilians (or “noncombatants”) are affected. The US must analyze its actions objectively, looking to the innocent groups that fall victim to their actions, and come to terms with whether or not the loss of noncombatant lives is worth its desired continuance of the “war on terror.” Concurrently, distinctions also must be made. Deliberate acts of terrorism must be distinguished from reckless acts that result in being viewed in the same vein.

                David Rodin raises some very important points in his paper, “Terrorism Without Intent,” about definitional inconsistencies and problems with the word “terrorism.” Rodin does a thorough job of accounting for the repeating qualities of what different schools of thought consider terrorism to be while also introducing his own caveats and aptly challenging notions of others in the field that believe that terrorism cannot be an act of a state. However, though Rodin’s argument strays from this idea, it may be worth distinguishing between reckless acts that result in terrorism and deliberate acts of terrorism. 

                It is made clear that the casualties caused by drone warfare are a form of terrorism when comparing the critique of the use of drones by the United States in its war on terror that Amanda Mullins provides in her piece to the definition of terrorism established by Rodin. This label might be difficult to accept for actions that are perceived to have noble intentions, but these acts must be looked at objectively. Though the US might simply be weighing the risk of the casualties that may result from its actions against the risk of the casualties that might happen if it does not act, it is problematic searching for how the noncombatants could benefit at all from these actions—even though they face the biggest risk arguably. For these reasons, it is fair to call these drone strikes terrorism due to the suffering and casualties that results or at the very least is risked.

                However, reckless acts such as drone strikes that result in suffering are still different from deliberate terrorist attacks—though these are both forms of terrorism. Rodin does not completely dismiss such ideas in his paper, but the feasibility of creating terms that will be adopted appears to dissuade him. As Rodin suggests, acts can unintentionally be terrorism. However, terms must be adopted that distinguish between deliberate and unintentional acts if one is to relate the actions of the US with other acts of terrorism.

                Finally, making this distinction might be considered jumping ahead. The main goal of Rodin’s paper is to introduce the idea that an objective definition of terrorism is broad enough to include actions of the United States and that a war on terror should not be fought using acts of terror. The first step would be for the United States to analyze its actions objectively and cease any actions such as drone warfare if they fall under this definition. Obviously, this step would need to be made in order for the process of distinguishing whether these acts are unintentional or not to gain relevance.