Comment paper 6

It seems more often than not that the biggest issue related to drones and many other technological advances in warfare is the lack of information provided and gathered by the government and the public alike.  Drones are debated wildly for their role in civilian deaths, however when one may try to research this topic, there are a wide array of varying opinions and statistics.  More so the long-term effect of using such technology is even more ambiguous.  The present problem is the lack of knowledge by both parties.  The government will not release certain information to the general public, while some issues have not even begun to be researched.  I feel this is a redundant topic; looking back at my previous post, I am still in accordance that the government has simply not been able to keep up and adapt with the rapid expansion of these new technologies and their implications.  Rather than imposing new sanctions, laws, and guidelines, high ranking government officials, including the President, have taken it upon themselves to make executive decisions.  However this is a fundamental problem, as it does not let the proper ways of the three-branch system of our government to function. 

An example of the discrepancies between information is demonstrated in the article “Fear the Reaper”. 

“According to its founder, Pakistani computer scientist Zeeshan-ul-hassan Usmani, the resulting numbers suggest civilians account for 88 percent of all drone-strike deaths in Pakistan since 2004.  But the New America Foundation's similar dataset, complied by analysts Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, shows drastically different results. They too rely on news reports, but they estimate the civilian fatality rate to be only 20 percent on average since 2004.” 

How are we to make any informed hypothesis about drones if we receive such a wide array of “facts”?  The main concerns that arise are civilian casualties as well as detachment; however neither have been studied intricately or at least not provided publically.  The lack of knowledge about drone strikes stems from ignorance as well as governmental overlook when dealing with their effects and methods.  The government needs to first address the problems with drones and then provide guidelines and conditions on how they can be used, otherwise their use will continue to rise without precedent.

Comment Paper 6 - The drone debate's need for an accurate civilian death count

                One of the most frequently recurring topics in the debate on drone usage is the effect that drone strikes have on civilian populations.  As the readings and lecture addressed, there is no one authority tasked with providing accurate and unbiased information on civilian deaths that result from the use of drones.  This causes significant flaws to both sides of the argument when  discussing the morality of drone usage.  Civilian casualty figures are used as reasons for why or why not drones should be utilized.  However, sources like the Pakistan Body Count claim that 88% of casualties in drone strikes are civilian while the New America Foundation estimates that 20% of drone strike casualties are civilian.  These studies, while they have differing criteria for who is labeled a terrorist or combatant, are based on reports from undoubtedly biased sources such as Pakistani journalists and even the Pakistani Taliban.  In order to have proper discourse on how effective drones are in preventing civilian deaths, there must first be consistent civilian casualty numbers reported by a relatively unbiased source.

                If accurate information is needed in order to have an informed debate on drone usage, how can we obtain that information?  First, Pakistani authorities must allow foreign  journalists entrance and protection  in the tribal areas.  However, enticing the Pakistani government execute this would be wildly difficult because they view drone strikes as an encroachment on their sovereignty and would rather inflate numbers than allow objective reporting.  According to Christine Fair, potentially one third of Pakistani journalists are on the ISI’s payroll.  Additionally, the Pakistani government may not be able to provide sufficient protection to the journalists, which may discourage reporters from traveling to afflicted areas.

                In addition to Pakistani cooperation, the U.S. must admit the existence of a drone program and de-classify some information surrounding the drone program’s usage.  For example, if the government reported information about the attacks it executed along with a casualty count, media sources in Pakistan would have information to compare to and would also immediately know which areas were affected.  Recognition of the drone program and declassification of strikes once they are carried out would also quell fears of an entirely unchecked drone program. 

                While both sides of the drone debate have valid concerns, civilian casualty numbers are too crude and have been used too often as reasons for supporting or opposing the drone program.  If accurate information on civilian casualties becomes available, then a well informed debate can begin.  The figures released would allow proponents of drone usage to compare drone civilian death rates to death rates that result from other means of aggression.  Additionally, opponents would be able to accurately consider whether or not the civilian death count is too high.

                

Comment #6

 What was made most apparent in the final readings for the class was information and how vital it is for the future of drone warfare. From statistics regarding civilian casualties to information regarding how vetted the targets were before being killed by the drones, all existing information seems to have a bias of some kind. For these reasons, it appears to be strange that anyone would be able to take a strong stance either way on drone strikes when no clear statistics regarding drone warfare seem to exist. The US may claim that transparency might interfere with the effectiveness of their drone use in warfare might be compromised if more information is released, but the US must be willing to make certain sacrifices if they do not wish for the approval ratings of drone strikes to continue to decrease.

                In the “Don’t Fear the Reaper” piece, it was interesting that many of the misconceptions were considered misconceptions largely because they did not have any statistics or studies to back up with claims. However, no studies existed to actually claim that they were not true either. Yes, Carpenter did have some other (albeit minor) points in addition to the lack of studies to cast doubt on fears regarding drone warfare, but none of them really built any confidence. Not enough studies have been done on the impacts of drones on warfare and (as the readings have suggested) there is no reliable source on the deaths of noncombatants. Really, it is difficult to take a stance on drone warfare that is not conceptual instead of one actually based on solid statistics.

                Though such statistics might be greatly needed, the main obstacle that stands in the way is the US government itself. It has been discussed that transparency could reduce the effectiveness of the US’ drone strikes. However, in order for the population of the US to even be comfortable with the continuance of drone warfare, statistics must be made known and drone warfare must become more transparent. If drone warfare is as effective as the government says it is, the population might be more comfortable with its use after more reliable studies have been release that suggest so. 

Comment Paper 6-- The Future Debate

After reading the article Improving the Drones Debate it became apparent clear that need to set guidelines within the debate is essential to unpacking the question as to when it is permissible to use drones in the United States.   So much of what we hear about on both ends of the political spectrum in this country violates the tenants that Bashir outlines in this article.  The main element that I is so apparent in our culture that is arguable not constructive to the debate it he idea of continuing to ask questions instead of provide answers.  Even within my own blog post, it is easy to get caught up in asking more questions about the ethical nature of unmanned strikes instead of answering already posed questions.  If both sides are able to answer simple questions as to if it just to have an enemy that is not harmed when it is killed or it controlled by people on the other side of the world, we would be able to better grasp where the nation stands on this issue.  Furthermore it seems that it is so easy to just continue extending the argument by asking more questions as a means for not coming to terms with the problems that face this topic.  The other element that I find important is the idea of being careful as to how the world perceived our drone program.  It is critical that the United States gives off the image that we are careful when it comes to the use of drones and that we encourage other nations to be careful if they were to possess this technology.

The element that I think that Bashir leaves out of his advice is that the nation must be careful as to what labels they place on their enemies.  So often this country comes up with words to label people we do not agree with as a mean for getting support.  The problem with this is that is corrupt the discussion because we overlook the true values of the people we are targeting.  If we label both an organized group that commits violence for political gain (Taliban) as that same as an organization that engages community organization and may conduct violence as a byproduct (Hamas) the same thing than we are unable to effectively evaluate where it appropriate to use drones.  One of these groups may be far more effectively motivated by the use of drones than the other.  Knowing the effectiveness for the strategy is key to knowing if the strategy is worth using.  We must be clever in clearly identifying each group to the public and not bulking grouping very different groups to gather as a means for getting a green light on using a new war technology.  If the public is educated about the individual characteristics of the people that are on the receiving end of a drone strike than they are better able to derive a true opinion as to the appropriate use of these weapons.  Their judgment is not clouded into thinking that both groups are the same.  The debate will continue and we must not only focus on the critical issues and keep the discussion tightly focused, but also remain educated in the differences in the organization of the groups we attack.

Comment Paper #6

This weeks readings brought several new and several repeated argument for and against drone strikes. The main points which I found particularly worth investigating are the wide variety of sources and codes for calculating casualties and the idea of human detachment. I think it is clear that many opponents and even some supporters of drone strikes would like to see more transparency and this seems to me that this alone could help to settle many of the issues, but of course like many cure all solutions this one is simply unattainable. It is not for lack of trying that we don't have accurate or trustworthy numbers, but simply that the line separating militant and non-combatant are so blurred that there is no way we can really know what the outcome of any attack is. Drones can "look" at the damage but not having feet on the ground hurts our ability to examine bodies, damage, and see the other unaccounted damage. We also cannot trust local sources as they are apparently paid by ISI. So really I think it is necessary not to look at the numbers on their own or even the supposed numbers but instead at the alternative.

I think that we can easily use bin Laden's death as evidence of the alternative. In bin Laden's case, the special operatives were given orders to kill or capture but never once considered the capture aspect for a variety of reasons. So what happened in the raid? bin Lade was killed along with 2 others and 1 injured. Of those 3 most 2 could be considered non-combatants. As well if we look at the war in Iraq, most counts put the casualties at over 100,000 with most sources having over 60,000 of those being civilians. That is means 60% of all deaths were civilian. This seems in line with the average of all drone strike counts, but there is one crucial difference; in Iraq we lost 4,486 American soldiers. When a drone goes down, Americans go home in cars, not in caskets.

So while I think that many arguments we have read support drone warfare, I feel this weeks readings really showed a real comparison, and when trying to reveal some weakness revealed the main strength. Less Americans die and equal casualties occur. This is not to say I don't care about civilian casualties, but I do not think it is necessarily irresponsible for a country to first think of its citizens and then think of everyone else's.

Comment Paper

Comment Paper 6

Rich Russell

The article Don’t Fear the Reaper by Charlie Carpenter and Lina Shaikhouni discusses why we shouldn’t be so fearful of drones. Much of their argument revolves around the idea drones often serve nonlethal purposes such as intelligence gathering and surveillance. Also an incredibly important factor is that the drones are not autonomous and controlled by a human operator. Having an operator “in the loop” ensures supervision over the destructive power that many drones possess.

The “in the loop” idea of drones fascinates me because it seems to mirror the debate about guns and their destructive power. The argument by pro-gun supporters often is “guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” Though I am a supporter of this theory obviously drones can help kill more people. However, the discussion should include whether drones are inherently evil or the humans, who use them for destruction, constitute the real threat. Drones are simply big pieces of metal and fiberglass that have no destructive power without a human controller to tell them to kill. Any condemnation of drone use should start with the condemnation of the operators and their superiors because the “killer” part of it is controlled by humans.

Another point that Carpenter and Shaikhouri addressed with “in the loop” ideal is that debate over whether drones should become robots, which are autonomous. This would put the decision of whether to kill or not out of human hands. This decision should never be outsourced to machines because robots can’t take make decisions about what is right or wrong. Human lives are merely statistical. There should be very serious international mandates discouraging development and production of autonomous drones.

In conclusion, I think that the drone argument should really center on how humans are really the main vehicles of destructions. However, given a choice between human controlled drones and autonomous robots I take drones any day of the year. Humans must be regulate the destructive power of drones.

Comment Paper 5

                The Finkelstein, Ohlin, and Altman reading discussed three different interpretations of just war theory: Individualism, Collectivism, and Contractualism.  While these interpretations discuss the justification of combatants fighting against each other, they do not deeply discuss the targeting of civilians in warfare.  While all interpretations justify killing to eliminate a perceived unjust threat, they only acknowledge that combatants should be targeted, and gloss over the fact that many non-combatants are involved in the war-fighting effort.

                Individualism argues that the killing in warfare is the result of individuals facing threats from other individuals.  Soldiers are justified in killing because they are acting in self-defense.  Therefore, according to the authors, civilians should not be targeted because they do not pose a direct threat to the individual soldier.  Collectivism takes this notion even further and states that individual soldiers are part of a collective society.  Therefore, if the collective faces a threat, then it is the individual soldier’s responsibility to represent his collective and to eliminate the threats posed by the representatives of the other collective.  In this interpretation, civilians should not be targeted because they do not represent the collective and therefore do not pose a threat.  Lastly, Contractualism suggests that soldiers forfeit their right to life when going to war, but it is in the best interest of all belligerents to limit the human cost as much as possible.  Again, civilians should not be targeted due to the supposed in bello contract between states. 

                The interpretations of just war theory all argue that killing is moral when eliminating perceived unjust threats.  Individual enemy combatants pose the threat to the fullest extent because they carry out the attacks.  However, the absolute determination that combatants pose a threat and civilians do not is an oversimplification of a complicated matter.  While combatants pose the largest threat, civilians that can influence a side’s war-fighting capability can pose indirect threats as well.  Therefore, if a state goes to war against another state for a just reason, should the state that is attempting to eliminate the unjust threat be allowed to target those who pose indirect threats as well?  For example, assuming that the allied nations in World War II were at war for a just cause, can the strategic bombing  of German and Japanese industrial centers be in accordance with jus in bello?   

                My issue with the interpretations is that they attempt to describe legitimate targets in an objective manner when in reality the perceived threats that each individual target may pose is entirely subjective.  Even the definition of “combatant” is subjective.  Does this include all members of an opposing military or only the ones who are shooting at you?  Therefore, when discussing jus in bello, the best way for belligerents to act “morally” is not by letting the distinction of “combatant” or “non-combatant” determine whether a target is legitimate.  Rather, targets should be deemed legitimate if their elimination would potentially reduce the number of lives taken by an unjust threat.  Additionally, the aggressive actions of the “just” state should not be excessive, but enough to curtail the threats posed by the “unjust” enemy.  However, these two criteria are also subjective to individual interpretation.  Therefore, there can never be a unanimous understanding of who can be targeted and in what way.