Thursday, January 3, 2013

Comment Paper #1

I thought this week's readings were very interesting and brought many different issues and definitions to the table concerning terrorism. However I am inclined to disagree with all of them to a certain extent. First and foremost I do agree with Charles Tilly's statement that terrorism is a tactic or a tool and thus a group cannot be "terrorist." In fact I think this is supported now given that the term militant is the standard for labeling non-state actors in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, etc. We do not hear that 3 terrorists were killed in the Waziristan region, instead 3 militants were killed, these militants are then labeled as likely members of Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. It is also important to understand the nature of war. War has always tried to be just, and even in times gentlemanly, yet the goal of war is to win, and to win you must defeat your opponent in battle, in strength, in resources, tactics etc. Many wars have been won by tactics alone. Guerrilla warfare is a prime example of such a tactic. This was employed throughout the American Revolution and used with great success and met with great opposition among the British, as well as in Vietnam against American soldiers not equipped to meet such a threat. Thus, although we may label groups "guerrilla" or "terrorist" they are merely militant groups who's main tactic is guerrilla warfare or terrorism.

I believe that unlike Rodin's main argument and much like his final statement, the intention of the perpetrator and not the object of their violence is the key to terrorism. Rodin sees the use of violence against noncombatants as the moral line that separates war from terrorism. While it is true that many terrorists attack noncombatants, for me this is not the ultimate defining characteristic. The defining characteristic of terrorism is to instill fear in a group so as to advance political or ideological goals. Now that is not to say that the attacking of noncombatants is not terrorism, it is merely a tool of terrorism. Now if we look at what we currently refer to as terrorism we see this form most strongly adheres to my idea that the motive defines the tactic. This form of terrorism involves striking both civilian and soldiers in a way that causes psychological harm and instills fear that goes beyond that which is normal in war. This is seen best in the current paranoia today, although statistically speaking, we are all more likely to be struck by lightning than die in a terrorist attack, we still are wary and suspicious perhaps even racist and to those who have experienced attacks the effects are far more serious. A Taliban agent who infiltrates an American camp dressed as an Afghan regular and fire at will instills a mistrust in American soldiers who will now be suspicious of every Afghan soldier, yet his act was against combatants. Now Rodin also talks about reckless or negligent acts, while these are no doubt morally wrong and need be addressed, they are not terrorism. Recklessness and negligence are not pursued for ideological purposes and are no more terrorist tactics than friendly fire.

Rodin believes that intention is not enough to classify something as permissible or as terrorist. He seems to cite negligence and recklessness as evidence of this. However negligence and recklessness are not tactics and are punishable under international laws and humanitarian laws yet they do not carry the same malicious intent as terrorism. Recklessness and negligence again are morally wrong when they cause harm but are the products not of intention and they are not used as tools to further certain goals.

So while militant groups may target civilians this is not what defines terrorism, instead it is the effect their actions will have on the survivors which is the goal. I believe this definition is broad enough to encompass even American actions, particularly those of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the intention was to create fear and end a war, perhaps their ends were noble enough but the means were terrorism but the definition is also narrow enough in that intention drives all the other parts of Rodin's definition. Intention would cause the targeting of noncombatants for greater effect, intention is neither a state nor non-state idea, and as mentioned above negligence and recklessness are whole other crimes which are unrelated to terrorism.

5 comments:

  1. "War has always tried to be just..."

    Now sure that I would go this far...;-)

    More seriously, I wonder about justifying such actions because they are a part of war. This has happened in other posts both on this blog and others, but I wanted to bring it up. Is this enough to justify something that might otherwise look like terrorism? Can't wars themselves be fought for unjust reasons? Isn't that enough to make it as bad as terrorism?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I don't mean to justify them but more to put them in a category all their own, which in my opinion already exists: war crimes. As well I think many wars have been fought for unjust reasons, I can think of several, but what I was trying to convey was from the point of view of the aggressor, using the British gentleman's war as an example, that although many times they considered their motives just and tried to portray them as such the effects of their war was much like any other war. The same could maybe even be stretched to Hitler who at the heart of it wanted to created a new and powerful Germany, the means however were cruel and inhumane. So although I do not think war itself is often just, I think it would not happen unless the perpetrators convinced themselves and their supporters that the casus belli was just and sound.

      On the case of whether this makes them as bad as terrorism, sure, war crimes can be as bad or worse than terrorism however terrorism is not a description of moral wrongs, it is not on a 1-10 scale where 1 is peace and 10 is terrorism, they are simply different classifications of crimes.

      Delete
  2. Really interesting comment! Do you feel that intention solely defines acts of terrorism, though? Do you believe that if previous acts of terror were committed but the perpetrators had believed to be doing so in what they perceived to be self defense the label would switch from terrorism to something more fitting? I think an interesting aspect of "intention" is that it's so hard to gauge. I feel like we can only really gauge our own intentions and that trying to pinpoint what other countries intended can get us in a lot of trouble.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I think that intention is the defining characteristic of terrorism. I do believe there are other aspects to it such as the need for a ideological goal not just random violence. While I do agree intention is difficult to discern, I mentioned this in another comment, many terrorist groups make their intentions very clear maybe as shock value or maybe because they really have nothing else to lose and every ideology will gather supporters.

      As far as committing acts of terror in self defense this seems to be solved by my definition, the motive does not matter it is the intention that matters. I think, for example, had the U.S. responded to the 9/11 attacks by using terrorist tactics against Al-Qaeda then they would have been committing terrorism. Of course they did not attack Al-Qaeda (a difficult task which is another issue on its own) but instead Iraq and Afghanistan, which were not acts of terrorism however wrong many believe them to be. Immoral acts in war do not always equal terrorism.

      Delete
  3. I think it is very interesting that you point out that our revolutionary leaders and heroes could be classified as terrorists. We see them as fighting an oppressive government but I believe that many groups that our government classifies as terrorists worldwide have the same belief that they are fighting for freedom. Obviously the nature of war has changed but much of our tactics during the Revolutionary War were guerrilla tactics yet we condemn the violent guerrilla tactics of groups opposed to our world views.

    ReplyDelete