Monday, January 21, 2013

Comment paper 6



It seems more often than not that the biggest issue related to drones and many other technological advances in warfare is the lack of information provided and gathered by the government and the public alike.  Drones are debated wildly for their role in civilian deaths, however when one may try to research this topic, there are a wide array of varying opinions and statistics.  More so the long-term effect of using such technology is even more ambiguous.  The present problem is the lack of knowledge by both parties.  The government will not release certain information to the general public, while some issues have not even begun to be researched.  I feel this is a redundant topic; looking back at my previous post, I am still in accordance that the government has simply not been able to keep up and adapt with the rapid expansion of these new technologies and their implications.  Rather than imposing new sanctions, laws, and guidelines, high ranking government officials, including the President, have taken it upon themselves to make executive decisions.  However this is a fundamental problem, as it does not let the proper ways of the three-branch system of our government to function. 
An example of the discrepancies between information is demonstrated in the article “Fear the Reaper”. 
“According to its founder, Pakistani computer scientist Zeeshan-ul-hassan Usmani, the resulting numbers suggest civilians account for 88 percent of all drone-strike deaths in Pakistan since 2004.  But the New America Foundation's similar dataset, complied by analysts Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, shows drastically different results. They too rely on news reports, but they estimate the civilian fatality rate to be only 20 percent on average since 2004.” 
How are we to make any informed hypothesis about drones if we receive such a wide array of “facts”?  The main concerns that arise are civilian casualties as well as detachment; however neither have been studied intricately or at least not provided publically.  The lack of knowledge about drone strikes stems from ignorance as well as governmental overlook when dealing with their effects and methods.  The government needs to first address the problems with drones and then provide guidelines and conditions on how they can be used, otherwise their use will continue to rise without precedent.

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Comment Paper 6 - The drone debate's need for an accurate civilian death count


                One of the most frequently recurring topics in the debate on drone usage is the effect that drone strikes have on civilian populations.  As the readings and lecture addressed, there is no one authority tasked with providing accurate and unbiased information on civilian deaths that result from the use of drones.  This causes significant flaws to both sides of the argument when  discussing the morality of drone usage.  Civilian casualty figures are used as reasons for why or why not drones should be utilized.  However, sources like the Pakistan Body Count claim that 88% of casualties in drone strikes are civilian while the New America Foundation estimates that 20% of drone strike casualties are civilian.  These studies, while they have differing criteria for who is labeled a terrorist or combatant, are based on reports from undoubtedly biased sources such as Pakistani journalists and even the Pakistani Taliban.  In order to have proper discourse on how effective drones are in preventing civilian deaths, there must first be consistent civilian casualty numbers reported by a relatively unbiased source.
                If accurate information is needed in order to have an informed debate on drone usage, how can we obtain that information?  First, Pakistani authorities must allow foreign  journalists entrance and protection  in the tribal areas.  However, enticing the Pakistani government execute this would be wildly difficult because they view drone strikes as an encroachment on their sovereignty and would rather inflate numbers than allow objective reporting.  According to Christine Fair, potentially one third of Pakistani journalists are on the ISI’s payroll.  Additionally, the Pakistani government may not be able to provide sufficient protection to the journalists, which may discourage reporters from traveling to afflicted areas.
                In addition to Pakistani cooperation, the U.S. must admit the existence of a drone program and de-classify some information surrounding the drone program’s usage.  For example, if the government reported information about the attacks it executed along with a casualty count, media sources in Pakistan would have information to compare to and would also immediately know which areas were affected.  Recognition of the drone program and declassification of strikes once they are carried out would also quell fears of an entirely unchecked drone program. 
                While both sides of the drone debate have valid concerns, civilian casualty numbers are too crude and have been used too often as reasons for supporting or opposing the drone program.  If accurate information on civilian casualties becomes available, then a well informed debate can begin.  The figures released would allow proponents of drone usage to compare drone civilian death rates to death rates that result from other means of aggression.  Additionally, opponents would be able to accurately consider whether or not the civilian death count is too high.
                

Comment #6


 What was made most apparent in the final readings for the class was information and how vital it is for the future of drone warfare. From statistics regarding civilian casualties to information regarding how vetted the targets were before being killed by the drones, all existing information seems to have a bias of some kind. For these reasons, it appears to be strange that anyone would be able to take a strong stance either way on drone strikes when no clear statistics regarding drone warfare seem to exist. The US may claim that transparency might interfere with the effectiveness of their drone use in warfare might be compromised if more information is released, but the US must be willing to make certain sacrifices if they do not wish for the approval ratings of drone strikes to continue to decrease.

                In the “Don’t Fear the Reaper” piece, it was interesting that many of the misconceptions were considered misconceptions largely because they did not have any statistics or studies to back up with claims. However, no studies existed to actually claim that they were not true either. Yes, Carpenter did have some other (albeit minor) points in addition to the lack of studies to cast doubt on fears regarding drone warfare, but none of them really built any confidence. Not enough studies have been done on the impacts of drones on warfare and (as the readings have suggested) there is no reliable source on the deaths of noncombatants. Really, it is difficult to take a stance on drone warfare that is not conceptual instead of one actually based on solid statistics.

                Though such statistics might be greatly needed, the main obstacle that stands in the way is the US government itself. It has been discussed that transparency could reduce the effectiveness of the US’ drone strikes. However, in order for the population of the US to even be comfortable with the continuance of drone warfare, statistics must be made known and drone warfare must become more transparent. If drone warfare is as effective as the government says it is, the population might be more comfortable with its use after more reliable studies have been release that suggest so. 

Comment Paper 6-- The Future Debate


After reading the article Improving the Drones Debate it became apparent clear that need to set guidelines within the debate is essential to unpacking the question as to when it is permissible to use drones in the United States.   So much of what we hear about on both ends of the political spectrum in this country violates the tenants that Bashir outlines in this article.  The main element that I is so apparent in our culture that is arguable not constructive to the debate it he idea of continuing to ask questions instead of provide answers.  Even within my own blog post, it is easy to get caught up in asking more questions about the ethical nature of unmanned strikes instead of answering already posed questions.  If both sides are able to answer simple questions as to if it just to have an enemy that is not harmed when it is killed or it controlled by people on the other side of the world, we would be able to better grasp where the nation stands on this issue.  Furthermore it seems that it is so easy to just continue extending the argument by asking more questions as a means for not coming to terms with the problems that face this topic.  The other element that I find important is the idea of being careful as to how the world perceived our drone program.  It is critical that the United States gives off the image that we are careful when it comes to the use of drones and that we encourage other nations to be careful if they were to possess this technology.
The element that I think that Bashir leaves out of his advice is that the nation must be careful as to what labels they place on their enemies.  So often this country comes up with words to label people we do not agree with as a mean for getting support.  The problem with this is that is corrupt the discussion because we overlook the true values of the people we are targeting.  If we label both an organized group that commits violence for political gain (Taliban) as that same as an organization that engages community organization and may conduct violence as a byproduct (Hamas) the same thing than we are unable to effectively evaluate where it appropriate to use drones.  One of these groups may be far more effectively motivated by the use of drones than the other.  Knowing the effectiveness for the strategy is key to knowing if the strategy is worth using.  We must be clever in clearly identifying each group to the public and not bulking grouping very different groups to gather as a means for getting a green light on using a new war technology.  If the public is educated about the individual characteristics of the people that are on the receiving end of a drone strike than they are better able to derive a true opinion as to the appropriate use of these weapons.  Their judgment is not clouded into thinking that both groups are the same.  The debate will continue and we must not only focus on the critical issues and keep the discussion tightly focused, but also remain educated in the differences in the organization of the groups we attack.

Comment Paper #6

This weeks readings brought several new and several repeated argument for and against drone strikes. The main points which I found particularly worth investigating are the wide variety of sources and codes for calculating casualties and the idea of human detachment. I think it is clear that many opponents and even some supporters of drone strikes would like to see more transparency and this seems to me that this alone could help to settle many of the issues, but of course like many cure all solutions this one is simply unattainable. It is not for lack of trying that we don't have accurate or trustworthy numbers, but simply that the line separating militant and non-combatant are so blurred that there is no way we can really know what the outcome of any attack is. Drones can "look" at the damage but not having feet on the ground hurts our ability to examine bodies, damage, and see the other unaccounted damage. We also cannot trust local sources as they are apparently paid by ISI. So really I think it is necessary not to look at the numbers on their own or even the supposed numbers but instead at the alternative.

I think that we can easily use bin Laden's death as evidence of the alternative. In bin Laden's case, the special operatives were given orders to kill or capture but never once considered the capture aspect for a variety of reasons. So what happened in the raid? bin Lade was killed along with 2 others and 1 injured. Of those 3 most 2 could be considered non-combatants. As well if we look at the war in Iraq, most counts put the casualties at over 100,000 with most sources having over 60,000 of those being civilians. That is means 60% of all deaths were civilian. This seems in line with the average of all drone strike counts, but there is one crucial difference; in Iraq we lost 4,486 American soldiers. When a drone goes down, Americans go home in cars, not in caskets.

So while I think that many arguments we have read support drone warfare, I feel this weeks readings really showed a real comparison, and when trying to reveal some weakness revealed the main strength. Less Americans die and equal casualties occur. This is not to say I don't care about civilian casualties, but I do not think it is necessarily irresponsible for a country to first think of its citizens and then think of everyone else's.

Comment Paper


Comment Paper 6
Rich Russell
The article Don’t Fear the Reaper by Charlie Carpenter and Lina Shaikhouni discusses why we shouldn’t be so fearful of drones. Much of their argument revolves around the idea drones often serve nonlethal purposes such as intelligence gathering and surveillance. Also an incredibly important factor is that the drones are not autonomous and controlled by a human operator. Having an operator “in the loop” ensures supervision over the destructive power that many drones possess.
The “in the loop” idea of drones fascinates me because it seems to mirror the debate about guns and their destructive power. The argument by pro-gun supporters often is “guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” Though I am a supporter of this theory obviously drones can help kill more people. However, the discussion should include whether drones are inherently evil or the humans, who use them for destruction, constitute the real threat. Drones are simply big pieces of metal and fiberglass that have no destructive power without a human controller to tell them to kill. Any condemnation of drone use should start with the condemnation of the operators and their superiors because the “killer” part of it is controlled by humans.
Another point that Carpenter and Shaikhouri addressed with “in the loop” ideal is that debate over whether drones should become robots, which are autonomous. This would put the decision of whether to kill or not out of human hands. This decision should never be outsourced to machines because robots can’t take make decisions about what is right or wrong. Human lives are merely statistical. There should be very serious international mandates discouraging development and production of autonomous drones.
In conclusion, I think that the drone argument should really center on how humans are really the main vehicles of destructions. However, given a choice between human controlled drones and autonomous robots I take drones any day of the year. Humans must be regulate the destructive power of drones.

Thursday, January 17, 2013

Comment Paper 5


                The Finkelstein, Ohlin, and Altman reading discussed three different interpretations of just war theory: Individualism, Collectivism, and Contractualism.  While these interpretations discuss the justification of combatants fighting against each other, they do not deeply discuss the targeting of civilians in warfare.  While all interpretations justify killing to eliminate a perceived unjust threat, they only acknowledge that combatants should be targeted, and gloss over the fact that many non-combatants are involved in the war-fighting effort.
                Individualism argues that the killing in warfare is the result of individuals facing threats from other individuals.  Soldiers are justified in killing because they are acting in self-defense.  Therefore, according to the authors, civilians should not be targeted because they do not pose a direct threat to the individual soldier.  Collectivism takes this notion even further and states that individual soldiers are part of a collective society.  Therefore, if the collective faces a threat, then it is the individual soldier’s responsibility to represent his collective and to eliminate the threats posed by the representatives of the other collective.  In this interpretation, civilians should not be targeted because they do not represent the collective and therefore do not pose a threat.  Lastly, Contractualism suggests that soldiers forfeit their right to life when going to war, but it is in the best interest of all belligerents to limit the human cost as much as possible.  Again, civilians should not be targeted due to the supposed in bello contract between states. 
                The interpretations of just war theory all argue that killing is moral when eliminating perceived unjust threats.  Individual enemy combatants pose the threat to the fullest extent because they carry out the attacks.  However, the absolute determination that combatants pose a threat and civilians do not is an oversimplification of a complicated matter.  While combatants pose the largest threat, civilians that can influence a side’s war-fighting capability can pose indirect threats as well.  Therefore, if a state goes to war against another state for a just reason, should the state that is attempting to eliminate the unjust threat be allowed to target those who pose indirect threats as well?  For example, assuming that the allied nations in World War II were at war for a just cause, can the strategic bombing  of German and Japanese industrial centers be in accordance with jus in bello?   
                My issue with the interpretations is that they attempt to describe legitimate targets in an objective manner when in reality the perceived threats that each individual target may pose is entirely subjective.  Even the definition of “combatant” is subjective.  Does this include all members of an opposing military or only the ones who are shooting at you?  Therefore, when discussing jus in bello, the best way for belligerents to act “morally” is not by letting the distinction of “combatant” or “non-combatant” determine whether a target is legitimate.  Rather, targets should be deemed legitimate if their elimination would potentially reduce the number of lives taken by an unjust threat.  Additionally, the aggressive actions of the “just” state should not be excessive, but enough to curtail the threats posed by the “unjust” enemy.  However, these two criteria are also subjective to individual interpretation.  Therefore, there can never be a unanimous understanding of who can be targeted and in what way.

Comment #5


                I believe that the neutrality principle concept that was explained in the Targeted Killings reading for this week caught my interest more than any of the other ideas presented. This concept echoed what I have speculated about in previous comments—usually regarding what dangers the US may face if other countries begin using drone warfare. If the world begins to operate on the US’ principle for targeted killings, what may become accepted as “just warfare” could become quite frightening. While removing drone warfare from the unstable confines of “whatever the US sees fit” and placing a solid principle that every country can use to justify such actions, we might actually be placing ourselves at risk—even though this is practically the same principle that we are currently using for our drone warfare.

                Not only should we anticipate the inevitable mainstream use of drones in warfare, but we also must brace ourselves for a principle that does not only bend to our view of the world—but bends towards the views of other countries also. If this principle includes an allowance for the targeted killings of terrorists, how will we know that what our society qualifies as terrorism will also match other countries’ definition? As we have learned during the first week in this class, it is not a stretch to say that some of the acts of the US could be considered terrorism. For this very reason, it is also not unforeseeable that the US could be the victim of targeted killings if this principle was set in place.

                This does not necessarily mean that these hypothetical attacks would be justified—whether the current attacks by the US or future hypothetical attacks by other countries are “right” or not does not come into play when analyzing this principle. However, it is apparent that a neutrality principle under which all countries would operate could be an extremely risky endeavor. While redefining or loosening the terms of murder, we would also be putting ourselves more at risk. We must understand that while continuing our own targeted killings, we are also continuing our commitment to a global principle which could later put us at risk—even once the war on terrorism is complete. It is crucial for us to determine if supporting a principle that contains such a large redefinition of murder and could inevitably be misinterpreted and used at our disadvantage really is worth the immediate benefit of targeted killing in our current war. 

Comment Paper 5



Comment Paper 5
            Just War Theory cannot be used solely to justify targeted killings because a targeted killing can involve much more than just simple warfare.  When war is declared, death is indeed inevitable; however it is not the objection of the war which is usually fought for some greater good.  With targeted killings, which often end up involving civilians, the just war theory is too broad to apply.  Daniel Statman’s jus in bello approach is accurate because terrorism and war are two separate entities.  Although the two terms often go hand in hand, if the reasoning behind the war is not defined as just then this extension of war, terrorism, is even less so.  Terrorism does not only encompass those who are in warfare such as soldiers, but also attacks civilians, just as targeted killings often do.  Although it can be argued that targeted killings could fulfill the principles of the just war theory, this is untrue.  An important principle to just war theory is that there must be a just cause.  How is this cause justified?  To one person or group something might seem morally right, to others just the opposite.  An example of this discrepancy is religion; there are many radical groups who believe they have a just reason for war or targeted killings.  However there are many people who do not believe religion is an acceptable reason for attack.  This “just cause” aspect is expansive, because different groups of people can have very different beliefs in what is justified and what is not.  Another characteristic of just war theory is that the violence must be proportional to the wrong.  In many cases of targeted killings there are civilians killed or hurt, not just the predicted target.  Targeted killings usually do not involve “old” warfare, such as on a battlefield.  Hence the targets are often hidden, creating a problematic solution when trying to avoid harming innocent people.  This then negates the argument of violence being a reason to perform targeted killings unless the target will be the only person affected.  I strongly believe in the protection of civilians; without this a nation will easily crumble in fear and disaster.  Therefore a targeted killing can only be used when no other non-related person is affected.
           

Comment Paper Five


Comment Paper 5

Rich Russell

            In the book Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in Asymmetrical World Chapter 3 is written by Daniel Statman. The chapter focuses on three Just War Theories which the idea of military ethics within the scope of war and now terrorism. The three theories are Individualism, Collectivism, and Constructualism. All three theories agree the war is not necessarily immoral though they define “moral wars” differently. Individualism states that the morality of defense in war is continuous with the morality of individual self-defense. In the theory of Collectivism the key factor is participation in war/terror by the subject at hand. Constructualism, primarily developed by Yitzhak Benbaji, has the view that combatants have forfeited their natural right to life while non-combatants may not be attacked with almost any exceptions.

            Having this background Jeremy Waldron establishes his norm for targeting of civilians. Civilians are worth of targeted killings if they are guilty of past terrorist activities or they are involved in planning terrorist atrocities in the future. With this criterion laid out it becomes an issue of ethics when discussing American drone attacks against civilians in Pakistan and all over the world. If one looks at the strikes from a non-nationalistic view, the killings in Pakistan and the Middle East do constitute strikes of terror by the U.S. government and specifically President Obama’s administration. I would go as far as to say that non-combatants in those countries can and should hate us as the US government is a perpetrator of terrorism. Jeremy Waldron’s first norm is broken by every attack that kills a civilian who are not guilty of past terrorism activity and are not planning terrorist activities in the future. Even more frightening is the idea that there is no judiciary process for the people who are killed. In essence our government is performing capital punishment on people who may or not be terrorists. The killing of the US citizen by drone attacks is even more egregious because of the lack of trial which our justice system guarantees.

            Though it is damaging to our patriotic view of America as a beacon of liberty and justice in the world, not recognizing that the US does not follow Just War Theories and breaks norms for the targeting of civilians is one of the great weaknesses of our democracy. Addressing these discrepancies is important in making America a true protector of freedom and human rights worldwide.

 

Comment Paper #5

Among all this weeks readings I found it interesting that we continually try to justify war and go so far as to set up rules for when war is just or unjust. First and foremost I think that this is a noble endeavor that seeks to limit war to times when it is necessary, but I also find it a bit over-optimistic that we think everyone will follow these rules and I think that is where the issue of TK is most evident.

As it stands now warfare is not anywhere near what is has been throughout history. Battles are not fought in the open where you know your enemy and can easily choose to shoot or not. Battles now are fought in skirmishes, urban settings, using hit and run tactics and covert operations. The complication of war has blurred the lines of proper conduct. As well, now that our use of TK is a counter terrorism tool, are we at war with terrorism? The U.S. apparently is, but terrorists aren't a state and they most certainly cannot be trusted to maintain the principles of just warfare.

As well, in general the ideas behind just war are extremely vague. How does one measure the proportionality of violence? Does everyone share the same views on right and wrong? No doubt at one point these ideas were common and agreed on but now, just war theory is dead. Combatants frankly are difficult to identify and chances are rarely given to execute a TK twice. So TK is just, not by just war theory, but because as of right now and given our goals in this war, it is our only option. Detaining would be near ineffective, deterrence would rarely work, only eliminating the threat works.

The Romantic Outlook On War in the US



After reading Coady’s argument outlining the roots of military romanticism, it seems that the United States adopts this policy.  The romantic approach to war supports that war is positive because it liberates people and allows for the spread of great ideas.  Here it seems that this is exactly what is endorsed by the United States.  The idea that war is a positive thing is on display in the country when looking at the news where pundits and press secretaries are arguing for the invasion of country under civil war as a means for bringing prosperity.  Furthermore, it seems that if war was a negative thing than the United States would avoid it at all costs.  Given that we allow for secret forces, the CIA, to infiltrate nations and act in a manner that potentially brings about war gives the impression that war in not a horrible thing.  The notion that war is positive is also communicated by the United States in that we hear constantly how wars bring about economic prosperity because it put people within our nation to work in creases output.  The United States has even twisted economic theory to suggest that there is a place for war in society and that it should not be considered a horrible thing. 
 
The next element that supports the romantic outlook on war is the notion that war is liberating.  When looking at the actions of both democratic and republican presidents, they approach any podium where they are justifying a war and immediately cite how they are freeing the people of a nation from a horrible ruler.  Look at the occupation of Afghanistan, the United States went on a propaganda spree to depict Sadam Hussein as a horrible ruler that terrorizes he people and the only way to free them is to invade the nation.  The same can be seen in Libya where news pundits and press conferences highlighted the horrific nature of the current leader and the need for an intervention to save the people.  

The final element is that idea that war is “virtue-promoting.”  The way that the United States controls a nation after occupation that territory is by setting up government systems that are said to be democratic and western in nature.  The governments constantly make that case that a democracy is the only way to live and all other nations with different systems are not allowing their citizens true freedom.  Here the US has clearly run on the mission of “spreading democracy” and the only way to do this is to unseat a regime and replace it with what America wants.  

Although it seems the conflict that the United States enters leaves nations better off, it would argue against that.  The romantic nature that surrounds war in this country is frightening and allows United States to overstep its bounds with invasive measures and intimidation.  Although this is the policy of the country, it is not sustainable, nor responsible.

Wednesday, January 16, 2013

Cooment Paper #4

Both the Arkin and Sharky articles offered differing view point on autonomous robots, specifically drone and war fighters. Although each brings up some valid points I think they each either ignore or deny the fact that war can change; it isn't as simple as people killing other people and general destruction. The nature and tactics of war are rapidly changing and are the result of both new enemies and new technology.

First and foremost, Arkin's plan for completely autonomous robots, whether they are used just to target other robots or humans, ignores the possible repercussions from using such a technology. The first, which is touched upon, is the availability of the same technology to other countries. War has often been a battle between who can spent to most resources, but if two nations with comparable forces and similar technology meet it could perhaps end in a draw when using autonomous robots. As well this again worries me that war will become a less politically risky action because there will be less bloodshed and therefore less public backlash. Second, Arkin doesn't see how insurgents have adapted thus far to our new warfare and use of drones. Autonomous robots will be very basic at first yet warfare has already moved away from isolated battles and into urban warfare and scattered skirmishes. As it stands there is no algorithm for deciding who is guilty and who can be shot, so how do we intend on programming this in a computer?

Sharky's side is equally thought provoking but I see similar flaws. Much of what he says I agree with, both from the robot's lack of intuition to the need for human participation in decision making. He does however make one point which I don't find isn't particularly strong. The first issue is that of responsibility and the ability to hold a person accountable for their actions. He argues that you cannot try and punish a robot. It simply does as it is programmed, so if it makes a mistake then how are we to rectify this? Well first these robots are programmed, so look to the programmers as well as those to test and authorize their use in battle. The testing and operational standards must be rigorous and allow for no error, if there is then it is because of negligence on the part of either manufacturer, programmer, or military testing. Second, do we really even try and punish those who violate the laws of war right now? Yes, we have punished genocidal lunatics after years of hunting them but when was the last time you heard about the US forces' atrocities? Abu Ghraib is the last I can think of and that even revealed the lack of care taken to protect the principles of war and the treatment of noncombatants/POWs.

So while neither has overwhelmingly convinced me, I do think that Arkin is far to optimistic and naive about the possible outcome these systems might have on war and Sharky both ignores the fact that atrocities happen now but also that there is always a human responsible.